Scenarios

Scenarios

Heyltex wants to emphasize that there are different scenarios available to authorities for planning purposes. These scenarios have proven to be useful for authorities’ preparedness. The US and European Union have published documents outlining different scenarios involving the use of CBRN. As an illustration, some of the scenarios are listed below.

guianaActual Radiological Incidents – The orphan source accident in Goiânia, Brazil, 1987

In 1987, Goiânia was startled by an extensive accident involving a lost radiation source. Two years before the accident, a 50.9 TBq Cs-137 teletherapy source was left behind when a radiotherapy institute moved to new premises. The still encapsulated source was taken up by two persons, who later on disassembled the source while compromising the encapsulation of the powdered radioactive material. Some of the components were sold to a scrap dealer, after which the scrap dealers and their family reported symptoms of radiation poisoning. They did not connect this to the source for about two weeks, but when suspicion rose, they went to see a doctor and brought the source with them. The doctor suspected that the material might be radioactive and reached out to persons with radiological expertise. However, by the time radioactivity was identified and the government informed, the radioactive powder already got the chance to spread extensively: 85 buildings and 50 vehicles were contaminated. As a result, 4 people died of radiation poisoning and 28 more received local radiation damage. 112.000 people sought medical attention, 600 were measures for contamination and 248 were actually contaminated.

For more information concerning this scenarios and others, please visit http://www.ffi.no/no/rapporter/d2-1-scenario-template-etc.pdf

clorinetruckUS Planning scenarios: Chemical attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion

In this scenario, the Universal Adversary (UA) infiltrates in an industrial facility storing a large amount of chlorine gas. Using a low-order explosive, the UA ruptures a storage tank. This releases a large quantity of chlorine gas, downwind of the site. Secondary devices are set to impact first responders. The UA, seeing opportunities for other operations with chlorine, researches industrial areas containing with companies that storage large amounts of chlorine. The selected site stores chlorine as a liquefied gas in a 60,000-gallon tank at 250 Pounds per Square Inch Gage (psig). The local cell of the UA rents a safe house close to the facility, purchases a detonation cord, explosives and light weapons. On the evening of the attack, when winds are most favorable for the next week, a four man technical team enters the facility by cutting a hole in the fence. The UA plants several IEDs and wrap the man-way flange with several turns of detonation cord and then cover the cord in tape that is painted the color of the tank. When it blows, it opens a 16-inch hole in the side of the tank. Just as the HAZMAT team is reporting to incident command, an IED explodes 15 feet from the HAZMAT team. Casualties occur onsite due to the explosive blast and fragmentation. While this is occurring, the city 911 system begins to receive numerous reports of a strong smell of chlorine and then of burning skin, eyes, and breathing difficulty. Most people heed the instructions, but 70,000 people of the downwind population ignore the advice and self-evacuate.

For more information concerning this scenarios and others, please visit https://www.llis.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/NPS-LLIS.pdf

subwayMASH Scenarios – Scenario 4: Dispersion of unknown toxic liquid in enclosed area

During the rush-hour, an assailant throws a small bottle down the staircase in a subway station. The bottle breaks, and after hitting the floor a liquid pool is formed. After a few seconds, the first persons start to report symptoms by coughing and having tear-running eyes. Close to the event, symptoms are heavier involving people reporting temporary blindness and severe difficulty of breathing. Shortly, panic breaks out when the 200 people present at the station try to leave the station to reach fresh air. The substance is volatile and evaporates spontaneously within 15 minutes, coming down to the fact that no technical counter-measure will be possible. The concentration of the substance is enough to make people instantly unable to help themselves, due to temporary blindness and severe difficulties to breath. Because of the short evaporation time, first-responders are only able to evacuate people, but temporary blindness and panic hinder smooth evacuation. There are some instances of traumatized people, due to the panic. The concentration dilutes by air movement and ventilation farther away from the event, causing a smell in other subway station which can cause some anxiety.

For more information concerning this scenarios and others, please visit http://www.mashproject.com/pdf/mash-d1-wp4-report.pdf

nycUS Planning Scenarios – Radiological Dispersal Devices

A perpetrator referred to as ‘Universal Adversary’ (UA) detonates dirty bombs containing Cesium Chloride (CsCl) in three separate, moderate to large cities that are proximal to each other. The U.S.-based cell that carries out attacks on U.S. cities, via black-market contacts, purchases three stolen seed irradiators that each contain approximately 2,300 curies of CsCi. The CsCi is put in plastic bags and stored in heavy lead shielding containers, to be smuggled by ship. Vans that have been painted in such a way as to appear as commercial delivery vehicles pick up the containers and transport them to safe houses near the target cities. Ammonium nitrate and fuel oil are also carried to safe house by the van. The bomb is assembled by mixing Ammonium Nitrate with Fuel Oil (ANFO; 95:5 by weight), with a 0.5-kilogram highly explosive core as a booster. Explosives are left in the van, which van drives to the location. At 11:15 AM, a 3000 pound bomb detonated containing 2,300 curies of 137Cs. At 12:30 PM bombs are detonated in City Two and Three resulting in a lack of emergency response in the last two cities because many responder assets have been dispatched to assist nearby City One with the response. The attack has resulted in 180 fatalities; 270 injuries; and 20.000 detectible contaminations (at each site), while 10,000 citizens are evacuated to shelters in safe areas; 25,000 in each city are given shelter-in-place instructions; and hundreds of thousands self-evacuate in anticipation of future attacks.

For more information concerning this scenarios and others, please visit https://www.llis.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/NPS-LLIS.pdf